Why UDA-ODM oversight team risks repeating BBI's fatal flaws

On August 6, 2025, President William Ruto and ODM leader Raila Odinga signed a statement establishing a five-member committee to oversee implementation of the National Dialogue Committee (NADCO) report and a 10-point agenda.

The aim was to address Kenya’s governance, devolution, youth empowerment challenges, leadership and integrity, the right to protest, the national debt, the fight against corruption, stopping wastage of public resources, promoting sovereignty of the people, rule of law and constitutionalism. This was an afterthought to the MoU signed between the United Democratic Alliance (UDA) and the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) on March 7, 2025, and coined as a response to public clamour, and presents an initiative riddled with flaws, tainted by partisan interests, and poised to repeat the constitutional missteps that derailed the Building Bridges Initiative (BBI).

With 91 registered political parties, 54 million citizens, and a looming 2027 election, the UDA-ODM team’s exclusivity, questionable legality, and opaque structure demand scrutiny and, if necessary, legal injunctions to protect Kenya’s constitutional integrity. The BBI’s collapse offers sobering lessons. In the Supreme Court’s Petition 12, 11 & 13 of 2021 (Consolidated), the court ruled that the President cannot initiate constitutional amendments under Article 257 (Popular Initiative), as this process must be exclusively citizen-driven. The BBI was struck down for its Executive-led nature, lack of transparency, and failure to respect institutional mandates.

Yet, the UDA-ODM committee mirrors these errors. President Ruto’s signature on the MoU and statement, alongside Odinga’s, raises immediate red flags. The Supreme Court’s ruling explicitly prohibits executive initiation of popular initiatives.

While the partisan Oversight Committee, which lacks the mandate of The People of Kenya, may not yet propose amendments, it’s potential to do so risks unconstitutionality as it is tied to the President. Why, then, was the MoU not structured as a parliamentary or popular initiative to ensure legal grounding?

The committee’s formation took six months after the MoU’s signing fueling perceptions of political maneuvering. Implementation is unlikely, with only 17 months before the 2027 polls, raising suspicions that the committee is a tactic to numb political agitations from The People of Kenya, disenchanted ODM supporters and critics of UDA.

The committee’s exclusivity is another glaring flaw. Kenya has 91 registered political parties, yet only UDA and ODM—likely representing fewer than 10 million members—drive this initiative. The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) facilitates 22 million registered voters, and Kenya’s population stands at 54 million. How can a committee led by two parties claim to represent the nation?

The committee’s vague promise of “extensive consultations” is unbankable beyond UDA-ODM strongholds. Were lessons from the BBI failures even considered?

Engaging arms of government and independent commissions based on a partisan MoU threatens constitutional integrity. With 24 by-elections due on November 27, 2025, the IEBC, recently reconstituted, cannot afford perceptions of bias in a process tied to two political heavyweights and risk violating its constitutional mandate.

Funding is another red flag. The committee is “fully funded” by UDA and ODM, which receive public resources through the Political Parties Fund. The committee’s reporting structure further undermines accountability. It submits bi-monthly reports to Ruto and Odinga and quarterly updates to a joint UDA-ODM parliamentary group, not directly to the public. The process connotes an elite pact, echoing BBI’s perception as a political deal.

A sincere initiative would have been constituted through Parliament under Article 256 or as a popular initiative under Article 257. Such a framework would ensure public participation, broader representation and constitutional legitimacy. The five-member committee lacks capacity to oversee implementation of the ten-point agenda and the NADCO report. That is the purview of Parliament and the Chapter Fifteen Commissions and Independent offices, exercising delegated sovereign authority from The People of Kenya.