Raila Odinga: The diplomat many didn't know

Late on January 16, 2011, in Abidjan’s Presidential Palace, Prime Minister Raila Odinga and three of us aides sat across a long table from Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo and his top generals, led by the powerful Army Chief of the General Staff, Gen. Philippe Mangou.

The meeting was not going well.

Raila was there as the African Union Envoy charged with a seemingly impossible task: to find a way to peacefully resolve the post-election violence which threatened to turn into a civil war over the disputed outcome of the election between President Gbagbo and his opponent, Alassane Ouattara.

Only once in Africa had such a deal been agreed: it was in Kenya, of course, when international mediation, led by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, produced an agreement in which an incumbent president agreed to share power with his challenger after a credibly disputed election.

But such an option was not available to Raila: the AU and the major Western powers had already determined Mr Ouattara was lawfully elected and had authorised the use of military force to oust Gbagbo as a last resort.

Raila was already on record that Gbagbo had lost the election and would need to step aside. But he played his cards carefully, stating in a statement that “we need to have reconciliation in order to unite the country so that the game of exclusion, which has been played for far too long, is resolved and the people are fully united. I think that Gbagbo has some fanatical support among his people, and unless there is a negotiated settlement there may be civil war in the event that Gbagbo is just driven out of power.”

There was one other challenge that Raila had to meet: finding a consensus position that all African presidents could sign on to if the mediation failed. So after Abidjan, whatever the outcome, Raila was going to visit the presidents of neighbouring Mali, Burkina Faso, and Ghana — all potential staging points for any use of force — as well as Nigeria, Angola, and South Africa.

I want to describe this mediation effort and its origins in a little more detail since the scores of wonderful tributes I have read have not focused much on Raila’s international engagements or standing. But let me first, in this two-part series, look at some critical, not-so-well-known moments of his political life, his pragmatism which was often overshadowed by his charismatic and fiery persona, and his always fascinating relationship with the media, which always knew that a headline about him would sell thousands more copies — or which could also break him.

Until 2007, Raila was a non-starter for most Western countries, the US in particular. Initially, this scepticism about Raila was a remnant from his father Jaramogi’s socialist ties and Raila’s having studied in East Germany — and naming his first son Fidel Castro Odhiambo Odinga. But even after it became clear that Raila was a successful businessman and fully aware of the role the private sector played in economic growth, reservations remained about his political activism and especially his independent bent.

In the 2007 Kenyan election, virtually all Western embassies were backing President Kibaki’s re-election and believed he would comfortably win the election, focusing only on the relatively positive economic growth. This was despite the formidable countrywide “Orange” coalition of leaders Raila amassed, which had wiped out Kibaki’s “Banana” group in the constitutional referendum by winning in seven of Kenya’s eight provinces.

The government’s patent rigging of the 2007 presidential election, and Raila’s subsequently giving up his claim to the presidency, made most Western nations look at him afresh. But in the days following the election, the US fought a rearguard battle, with Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer, a forceful and intelligent diplomat, flying in quickly.

I went with Raila to US Ambassador Michael Ranneberger’s house for the first of a few meetings with Ms Frazer, who urged Raila to accept the election result. She offered assurances that the US would strongly support him as the key reform leader, which would position him to be the comfortable front-runner in the next election.

This was, of course, unacceptable to Raila, but eventually, it was Ms Frazer’s boss, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who travelled to Nairobi and, in a meeting with the two principals, made clear that President Kibaki had to accept Raila as a partner.

This was a history-breaking arrangement — the first time an incumbent president in Africa had accepted, after a flawed election, to share power with his opponent. So we Kenyans should pay tribute to the many Western and other ambassadors who helped bring about a negotiated power-sharing agreement.

Among them, I recall the Canadian, Swiss, the EU, and the British, whose Lord Mark Malloch Brown, then a Minister of State in Gordon Brown’s Cabinet, took a personal interest in helping resolve the crisis. But most of all there were three very knowledgeable and hard-working women ambassadors — Elisabeth Barbier of France, Jacobsen of Norway, and most of all Laetitia van den Assum of the Netherlands — we owe a great deal to, Kofi Annan and his team apart, of course.

Ambassador van den Assum sent a very moving and meaningful remembrance of Raila: “It is not easy to do justice to a great man who dedicated his life to bring democracy to Kenya and its people. And it also brought back many of my own memories of the time after the 2007 election when so many were in danger. Raila showed what real leadership is.”

I must also pay tribute to Ambassador Ranneberger, who gave Raila and the government’s reform programme and the 2010 Constitution the fullest support, as did David Gordon, who was Ms Rice’s Director of Policy Planning and knew Kenya, having spent time here.

Raila’s international standing soared once he agreed to give up his quest for electoral justice and his own claim to the presidency in order to stop Kenya being torn into two. He had done so despite more than ample evidence of rigging.

Jeffrey Gettleman, a Pulitzer Prize-winning correspondent for The New York Times, had written that when he went to sleep, “Raila was about to win the Kenyan presidency. Raila was decisively leading, and he was about to do the impossible — unseat an incumbent president. But when I woke up, his lead had vanished. Election officials simply changed the vote tabulations. Observers, including me, were shocked by the brazen rigging. Chaos erupted. Kenyans felt wronged.”

So, as a junior partner named Prime Minister, Raila was suddenly in demand everywhere. Some events stand out. At the 2009 Davos meeting, Raila was sought by many dignitaries, the most interesting being David Cameron, the British Opposition Conservative Leader. He surprised me by seeking Raila’s views of other African countries and leaders, but not much about Kenya, but I suddenly realised that Raila’s Pan-African credentials and knowledge were useful to Mr Cameron as he prepared to himself become Prime Minister in the 2010 British election.

A few weeks later, in England, I accompanied Raila and Mama Ida to a private meeting with Prime Minister Gordon Brown and his wife Sarah Brown. Again, the brief discussion was more about Africa than Kenya, and I felt elated that these two British leaders were keenly aware of Raila’s Pan-African depth, intelligence, and objectivity, and were seeking his views on what British priorities should be for the continent.

There was an interesting postscript to the David Cameron meeting. In 2010 I was visiting London and Raila called to say that he had sought, through the British High Commission, to arrange a meeting with Mr Cameron when he would be in London the week after. But he was told that this was out of the question, as Mr Cameron had been elected just 10 days earlier and had hardly settled in, so he was not having any meetings with visiting dignitaries.

Raila asked if I could try to arrange a meeting. I said the chances were less than minuscule, but I would try. When I called a friend who worked as one of Mr Cameron’s advisers, he was unbelieving — “Salim, how can you even ask?” I gave him a couple of arguments for the meeting, and he was kind enough to be persuaded that he would at least put it to the PM without recommending it.

Well, lo and behold, my friend called back and said the Prime Minister had agreed! Raila would be the first outsider, the first leader, Mr Cameron would be seeing.

Raila had four advisers with him, and it was one of the most interesting and lively high-level meetings I had ever been in. Mr Cameron, who had formed a coalition to govern with the Liberal Democrats, had many sharp questions about how Raila was handling his own coalition role issues in Kenya.

This was one of Raila’s greatest diplomatic strengths — he was so immensely knowledgeable and learned that he could talk with leaders around the world about whatever they might be interested in.

I saw this happen with Mr Narendra Modi when he was Chief Minister of Gujarat. Mr Modi had invited Raila to be guest of honour at his annual Vibrant Gujarat Summit, where India’s top industrialists — Tata, Ambani, Adani, Birla — and others from around the world came to pledge billions of dollars and joint ventures. It was quite an honour and a great opportunity not only to meet a leader who was expected to be India’s PM one day but also the titans of industry who could invest in Kenya.

Raila was a big hit with Modi and others, talking with intimate ease about bridges, ports, roads, geothermal energy, and so on. The two really hit it off.

A few days later, there was a huge fire in Nairobi when a gasoline truck overturned and terribly burned many who rushed to scoop up the oil. I called Mr Modi’s office and asked if it would be possible to send plastic surgeons who were urgently needed. Three of them arrived in Kenya within a few days.

It was no surprise that the AU decided in late 2011 that Raila was the best bet for Côte d’Ivoire.

As described in my account earlier, the stakes were astronomically high in this crucial Francophone state. US President Barack Obama had become involved but had failed to win over Gbagbo with an offer of a senior international position or a professorship at a prestigious American university. How was Raila, with neither stick nor carrot, going to succeed in his mission?

So, seeing the laboured impasse in the Gbagbo meeting, I whispered in Raila’s ear that he should ask for time to consult with his team. Gbagbo agreed. Raila decided that since the generals were clearly constraining the president’s room for manoeuvre, he should ask for a private one-on-one meeting with Gbagbo.

That one-on-one resulted in President Gbagbo agreeing to lift the siege his troops had imposed on the Golf Hotel, where Mr Ouattara had been holed up since the election. This was to be a first step towards a face-to-face meeting between the two rivals. That was then presented to the generals, who signed on.

That thrilled us all. Raila held a press conference announcing a tentative intermediate agreement. Not long after, the president reneged on the deal. It was heartbreaking, but much more was left to do.

The meetings with the six other presidents in three days from one end of the continent to the other — from Mali in the far north to South Africa — were a fascinating, eye-opening experience. I had never seen anything like it, but most remarkable was the familiarity and respect shown to Raila. I also saw a master negotiator at work — something I had no clue about Raila.

In neighbouring Ghana, John Atta Mills was adamantly opposed to the use of force. Subsequently, he softened. South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma supported Gbagbo, as he told Raila in his jovial but no uncertain terms. Burkina Faso’s Blaise Compaoré, meeting late at night in what looked like a tented camp, said he would support Raila.

Mali’s President Amadou Touré and Angola’s José dos Santos were happy to go with the flow.

Raila met Nigeria’s Goodluck Jonathan, the most influential outside figure in the dispute, on the way into Abidjan to seek guidance, and then again on the return journey to brief him on his meeting.

Raila’s overall sense was that there was consensus in principle to use force as a very last resort — but no real appetite for it.

As we know, in the end, fighting between Gbagbo’s and Ouattara’s forces intensified, and the UN Security Council authorised the use of force to remove Gbagbo’s heavy artillery being used against civilians.

France launched military attacks and captured Gbagbo. He was handed over to the ICC for war crimes but was acquitted.

Ouattara has not ruled democratically.